Abstract
Democratic backsliding and illiberal democracies are a pressing issue for the EU. Hence, available tools for intervention (material sanctions and social influence) demand scrutiny for respective efficacy. While previous literature has examined mentioned tools, this essay provides insights on the connectedness of intervention efficacy and democratic legitimacy with two specialised agencies of the EU: the CoR and the EESC.
Further, solutions combining the proposal for a “democratic watchdog agency”, as suggested by Schlipphak & Treib (2017) , and the rebuilding of the consultative committees are suggested to meet the urgent matter of democratic backsliding.
Keywords
European Union; democratic backsliding; illiberal democracies; legitimacy; superfluous agencies
The membership with the European Union (EU) requires a certain set of standards, which each applicant must agree to. Among these Copenhagen Criteria, codified in the Articles 49 & 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 2008), a functional democratic governance is of vital importance. Yet, the EU is experiencing democratic backsliding. Illiberal tendencies can lead to vicious circles, as sanctioning them may lead to a “blame game” which in consequence may enforce anti-European movements (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017). Hence, the rise of EU-sceptical, nationalist voices within the EU MS calls for scrutiny of EU processes on different levels to tackle and avoid democratic deficit.
The EU seeks to legitimize integration processes and policies through democratic principles and mechanisms for public consultation. Among others, specialised agencies and channels for public commentary are installed to cater to legitimacy, their respective efficiency however remains disputable.
In order to examine the role of respective agencies in context of democratic backsliding, this essay will try to answer the following research question:
How can the EU prepare more legitimate specialised agency mechanisms in face of democratic backsliding to retain credible representation of the EU core values?
To answer this question, a content analysis on secondary literature on democratic backsliding, previously suggested solutions and specialised agencies will be consulted to provide a solid fundament for the discussion for recommendable mechanisms against democratic backsliding. Primary literature (EU-statistics, policy texts, official websites, …) will be included to examine existing approaches to respective problems. Therein, the aim of this essay is to develop a better understanding of the sources for Eurosceptic tendencies and to encourage probable future solutions.
The essay is structured as follows. First, a cross section of the state of anti-European developments in the EU blame game is provided. Second, it explains how democratic issues may occur through superfluous agencies and inefficient policies. Therein, the effects of superfluous agencies and inefficient policies on democratic legitimacy will be examined. Lastly, a discussion will cover possible solutions for future developments.
The Pew Research Centre published figures on the political distribution of the European parliamentarians which illustrate the growth of right-wing parties to a relative representation of 20% of the EP in 2014 (Desilver, 2019). The political science literature on the EU exhibits many mentions of the rise of Euroscepticism (Cengiz, 2018; Murray & Longo, 2018; Blauberger & Keleman, 2016) which comes in line with further figures of the Pew Research centre proposing an overall share of 29% of MEP belonging to Eurosceptic parties (Desilver, 2019). This development entails the question of why Euroscepticism is experiencing such prosperity?
One explanation may lie in strategies of blame shifting and avoidance, which are often used by domestic élites to rectify own mistakes (Weaver, 1986; Boin et al., 2009; Hood et al., 2000; Carlin et al., 2015; Crescenzi & Giua, 2019). There are different strategies which governments utilize to improve their public standing. The motivation for such strategies reaches from seeking prestige and social recognition to the urge of increasing governmental power (Nyyssönnen, 2018).
Murray (2017), for example, describes the effect of a “rally-round-the-flag”, which is the inclination of citizens to trust their national governments more in the event of crises, when external interventions are framed negatively. Similarly, Bargaoanu and Negrea-Busuioc (2016) describe “The Rise of Euroscepticism in Time of Crisis”. These phenomena do not appear to take effect in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic in Austria.[i] Notwithstanding, strategies of framing and blame shifting can be successful, as seen in the “blame game”.[ii]
In their paper “Playing the blame game on Brussels”, Schlipphak & Treib (2017) name three main conditions under which national governments and oppositions may criticize EU legislators in a blame game. The first condition is outside intervention. In face of negative national publicity or adverse perception of domestic intervention, framing the external (f.e. the EU) in a negative light can whitewhash national matters and promote national support from civilians. To avoid this, Schlipphak & Treib (2017) suggest mechanisms which transport citizen complaints to utilize social pressure, rather than material sanctions. Low formal obstacles for the activation of such mechanism are suggested, such as offices in each MS as contact points for appellants.
The second condition for blame games are sanctions against a member state affecting the entire country. Schlipphak & Treib (2017) dehort from such broad interventions, and instead advocate to focus them only on the wrongdoers. The Hungarian Fidesz party’s membership exclusion from the European People’s Part (EPP) is provided for an exemplary intervention.
The last condition of the blame game touches the matter of interventions being framed as illegitimately crossing national affairs. Generally, the public assesses legitimacy according to the perceived possibilities for participation in democratic policy making, called input legitimacy (Cengiz, 2018), the efficacy of policies to the satisfaction of public needs (output legitimacy) and the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of governmental processes, throughput legitimacy (Schmidt et al., 2013 & 2019). Hence, framing EU interventions as illegitimate can benefit illiberal governments. In order to unhinge this possibility for a blame game, the authors appeal on the necessity for “an open, independent and impartial assessment of the situation in the respective member state. (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017)”. This strategy relies on social pressure and persuasion, which is promoted by Sedelmeier (2017).
Schlipphak & Treib (2017) suggest countering the blame game and legitimacy problem with building a new independent and transparent supervisory body for the monitoring and control of EU core principles and rule of law. This expert-lead “democracy watchdog” would facilitate offices in every MS, include civil voices and be constituted of experts from all relevant fields independent from political influence. While Schlipphak & Treib argue for a non-binding character of the supervisory body, entailed political sanctions could entail material sanctions through Article 7 TEU.
Article 7 TEU enables the European Council to suspend MS, which are culpable of “serious and persistent” breaches of the liberal democratic values contained in Art. 2 TEU, of membership rights like voting rights in the Council and the withholding of funds (Sedelmeier, 2017). Sedelmeier however finds several obstacles for the use of Art 7 TEU, thus he appeals to an increased focus on social sanctions, particularly the 2014 implemented Commission’s Rule of Law Dialogue. This open action is a public pre-warning dialogue with the potential to propose the use of Art 7. Yet, an increased use of stronger sanctions may be paralleled by blame shifting strategies of culprits (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017). In contrast, Blauberger & Kelemen (2017) argue that the application of material interventions could raise public trust in the EU.
The EU Justice Scoreboard[1], as a measurement for the quality of national justice systems, similar to the EU Quality of Government Index, is worth mentioning as a source for operating figures for evaluating effectiveness of political measures.
Other noteworthy existing interventions are budget regulatory interventions which do not require unanimity (Neuwahl & Kovacs, 2021) as well as judicial safeguards of centralized monitoring and decentralized litigation (Blauberger & Kelemen, 2017).
Before proposing a novel approach for a more socially backed and legitimate agency, the next chapter will focus on two existing specialised agencies, installed to convey legitimacy.
The facilitation of input legitimacy and a representative responsibility towards the opinion of EU civilians and organizations depict the central tasks of two specialised consultative agencies, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and Committee of the Regions (CoR). These advisory bodies are involved in 70% of all EU legislative decisions to provide unified, representative opinions of different civilian groups and local agendas for the consultation for the members of the EP (CoR: About, 2021). The CoR, constituted by 329 elected local politicians from local governments and 329 alternates, is installed as an extension of civilian’s voices. The EESC represents interest groups like employers and employees as well as economic and cultural agendas. However, the EU legislators are not obliged to read these opinions (McCormick, 2020). Hönnige and Panke (2016) found, that the works of the advisory bodies are hardly regarded.[iii] The influence of the EESC and CoR would be improved through quick and high-quality delivery of advice, yet the agencies face a race against time, as they receive legislative proposals from the EC at the same time as the legislative bodies, hence they have to deliver an opinion before the policy makers have set their mind. A positive effect of the consultative agencies on legitimacy thus can be doubted, considering the limited awareness opposed by annual costs. The drafted annual total budget of the CoR & EESC for 2021 amounts to € 256 mio. (EC Documents: CoR Budget, 2021 & EESC Budget, 2021). These budgets are vulnerable for negative framing, despite their small share of the total multiannual EU budget of € 1,8 trillion (European Council, Multiannual Financial Framework, 2021).
In the following this essay discusses how the conversion of the consultative committees into an advisory bureau of a democratic watchdog agency could prove adjuvant for the EU integration process.
Discussion & Conclusion
The previous literature provides a number of answers to the initial research question for more legitimate and effective agency mechanisms against democratic backsliding.
Sedelmeier (2017) proposed “modest institutional innovations”. Concluding the previous insights, this paper however wants to provide a bold innovation by suggesting a hybrid agency, merging Schlipphak & Treib’s (2017) idea for a supervisory body with the implementation of the consultative committees. The inclusion of the consultative committees would benefit the impartiality of the novel institution, as it would actively include the domestic civilian opinion into its work. As Blauberger and Keleman (2017) write “judicial tools alone will not suffice to stop democratic backsliding”, hence the combination of mechanisms for social pressure with such of material law could be achieved through the novel institution.
As the specialised consultative agencies alone lack efficacy, their implementation can prove beneficial, not only cost-wise, but for the legitimacy of the control agency’s supranational competencies, by hindering blame games for anti-European member states, as arguing against the agency would imply arguing against the public will. As Schlipphak & Treib (2017) mention, it is more difficult to engulf in a blame game if “intervention is built upon the involvement of domestic actors.”
The party-political element with the implementation of CoR members does contradict the requirement of independent experts, hence I suggest their replacement through independent heads of the local offices of the novel institution. These would stand in close exchange with the reigning local governments and thereby preserve the closeness to civilians without the inclination of acting on party political incentives. The members of the CoR are not paid for agency work and often dispatch their alternates to substitute them, reducing the democratic value of their local election.
The proposed agency extends the existing literature with a novel idea to tackle issues of democratic backsliding in the EU, and thereby provides a possible answer to the initial research questions.
These considerations could be further extended by considering the innovative proposals of Scheppele (2013), Kochenov (2015), Von Bogdandy et al. (2012 & 2015) and literature on public opinion and the influence of new media.
It may seem paradox to suggest the dissolution of an agency, which has as number-one-priority the reinforcement and rethinking of European democracy (CoR: Priorities, 2021), yet the current times ask a bold institutional reformation.
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Notes
[1] https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_de
[i] Polls show the fall in popularity of the incumbent government, especially the approval of Austrian Chancelor Sebastian Kurz which has fallen by 11% (OGM/APA-Vertrauensindex Bundespolitiker Juni 2021). While in 2020 the Austrian government enjoyed a record high trust with 59% trusting the government and only 37% not having faith in the government, these numbers have transformed into the opposite (Statista, April 2021). The trust in the European Union however has only varied by 1%, as polls conducted by the EC show (Statista, April 2021). A similar case in regard of Hungary is noted in Schlipphak & Treib’s work (2017).
[ii] Looking back at blame shifting, the Hungarian government has obvious reason to shift attention from its failed utilisation of relatively high amounts of funding on alleged “expensive EU membership”. While Hungary remains in the lower section of EU monetary contributors (https://www.statista.com/statistics/316691/eu-budget-contributions-by-country/ ), it is ranked one of the highest beneficiaries of EU money (https://www.statista.com/chart/18794/net-contributors-to-eu-budget/ ). Yet the Hungarian government does not stop in framing the EU as a costly affair for its country. Crescenzi & Giua’s study on cohesion in the EU(2020) found that the local quality of government is a main factor for the degree of funding efficacy. Considering the Hungarian blame shifting and campaign against the EU (Presse Beispiel) corresponds with their negative value in the European Quality of Government Index (Charron et al., 2021. https://qog01-p.gu.gu.se/shiny/users/xalvna/qog/eqi_map/ )
[iii] The results from a standardized online survey showed that 23.4% of the members of EP and the Council do not read the advisory recommendations at all and on a scale from 1 (never reads opinions) to 10 (always reads opinions), the mean was 3.43 (Hönnige and Panke, 2016).
[i] Polls show the fall in popularity of the incumbent government, especially the approval of Austrian Chancelor Sebastian Kurz which has fallen by 11% (OGM/APA-Vertrauensindex Bundespolitiker Juni 2021). While in 2020 the Austrian government enjoyed a record high trust with 59% trusting the government and only 37% not having faith in the government, these numbers have transformed into the opposite (Statista, April 2021). The trust in the European Union however has only varied by 1%, as polls conducted by the EC show (Statista, April 2021). A similar case in regard of Hungary is noted in Schlipphak & Treib’s work (2017).
[ii] Looking back at blame shifting, the Hungarian government has obvious reason to shift attention from its failed utilisation of relatively high amounts of funding on alleged “expensive EU membership”. While Hungary remains in the lower section of EU monetary contributors (https://www.statista.com/statistics/316691/eu-budget-contributions-by-country/ ), it is ranked one of the highest beneficiaries of EU money (https://www.statista.com/chart/18794/net-contributors-to-eu-budget/ ). Yet the Hungarian government does not stop in framing the EU as a costly affair for its country. Crescenzi & Giua’s study on cohesion in the EU(2020) found that the local quality of government is a main factor for the degree of funding efficacy. Considering the Hungarian blame shifting and campaign against the EU (Presse Beispiel) corresponds with their negative value in the European Quality of Government Index (Charron et al., 2021. https://qog01-p.gu.gu.se/shiny/users/xalvna/qog/eqi_map/ )
[iii] The results from a standardized online survey showed that 23.4% of the members of EP and the Council do not read the advisory recommendations at all and on a scale from 1 (never reads opinions) to 10 (always reads opinions), the mean was 3.43 (Hönnige and Panke, 2016).
